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A  reasonably  strong  case  can  be made  that  the wheat  industry
over  the past forty years  has made  substantial  net contributions  to
the  economic  growth  of  the United  States.  Also,  government  pro-
grams  undoubtedly  have  greatly  affected  the  export  of  wheat  and
foreign  trade  of other agricultural  products  during the past  several
decades.  The third factor, political  feasibility,  is perhaps  the area  of
greatest  uncertainty.
In  trying to  evaluate  the wheat  program,  we  can  bring to  bear
objective  measurements  of  what  happened  and  subjective  inter-
pretations  of  the  meaning  of  these  events.  I  believe  that we  can
agree fairly well on the scope  and nature  of these events.  We  prob-
ably  will  not agree  as  fully  on what  these  events  mean.
GOVERNMENT  PROGRAMS
Also,  before  considering  data  available  for  use  in  evaluation,
we  should be somewhat  more  specific  about what  government  pro-
grams  are under discussion.  I assume we  are discussing  programs  of
the  federal  government  which  directly  affect  the  supply  of  wheat
and the forces brought to bear on the market through discriminatory
government commercial action.
Under  this  concept,  government  wheat  programs  began  during
World  War  I  with  the  direct  intervention  by  government  in  the
wheat  market  with  established  prices  and  a  purchasing  monopoly.
Farmers were encouraged to grow more wheat by direct government
action.  Following  the war  an  indirect  approach  was  undertaken-
supplying  outlook  information.  The  next  direct  program  was  the
Federal Farm Board. Discriminatory  government commercial  action
was taken  to encourage  orderly  marketing.  The  program  failed.
Since  the  1930's  we  have had a succession  of programs  directly
affecting production  as well as providing discriminatory  government
commercial  action,  or  a  combination  of  both.  Each  act  seemingly
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management  and  operation  of the  U.  S. wheat  industry.
ECONOMIC  GROWTH
A  casual  examination  would  lead  to  the  conclusion  that wheat
programs  have hampered  economic  growth.  That is, in view  of  the
surplus of  wheat,  too many resources  obviously  have  been  used  in
its  production.  Since  these  resources  might  have  been  used  to
produce something else having a greater marginal value, they  could
have contributed  more  effectively  to economic  growth.
Several  assumptions  are  implicit  in  this  line  of  reasoning.  One
is that  government  wheat  programs  have  caused  the  surplus  of
wheat.  Government  programs  may well have helped  in making the
surplus  take  the  form  of  wheat.  Without  those  programs  the  sur-
plus might have been in the  form  of corn,  soybeans,  hogs,  or cattle.
However,  we have almost universal  agreement  that we  would have
had  a surplus  of  resources  in  agriculture  over  the past  forty  years
or so without a government  program.  Consequently,  we would have
had surpluses  of something. What commodity  do you wish to be  in
surplus?
So  the pertinent  question  is, has  concentration  of  surpluses  in
the  form  of  wheat  retarded  economic  growth  more  than  it  would
have been retarded with surpluses of other commodities?
Another  implicit  assumption  is that wheat  programs  have  con-
tributed very  little,  or nothing,  to the  technology  of wheat  produc-
tion,  processing,  or  marketing.  The question  does  not  lend  itself to
statistical proof.  Many feel that wheat farmers  have been  stimulated
to adopt  new  technology  at a  faster pace  than they  would  have  in
the  absence  of  wheat  programs.  If  this  contention  is true,  then
wheat  programs  may  have  made  a  net  contribution  to  economic
growth. I do not say that this is true. All  I want to point out is that
those  who  argue  that  wheat  programs  have  retarded  economic
growth  should  also  take  into  account  the  claims,  often  by  those
same  people  in  a different  context,  that wheat  farmers  have  been
stimulated  to greater  production  by the  same program.
If we  consider  the release  of manpower  from  direct production
of  wheat  to  something  else,  then  changes  in  the  wheat  industry
have  made  a  substantial  contribution  to  economic  growth.  To
illustrate,  consider the changes  in man-hours  per unit of production
of  wheat  and  milk.  The  man-hours  required  for  the  production  of
100 pounds of wheat today is slightly over  10 percent of the require-
ments  in 1910-14,  and for  100  pounds  of  milk,  35 percent.
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a  plateau  from  1911  to  the  mid-1930's,  the  trend  turned  rather
dramatically  upward.  After  World War  II,  when  acreage  was  un-
restricted,  yields remained  at a fairly even  level until acreage  allot-
ments were proclaimed  for the  1954 crop.  With acreage  allotments,
yields again rose to an average  nearly double the pre-World War  II
level.  Some  of  the  yield  increase  can  be  attributed  to  favorable
weather,  to  retirement  of  poor  soils,  and  to  improved  varieties.
However,  growers  may  have  sought,  learned  about,  and  applied
improved  technology  to  offset  acreage  reduction  with  increased
yields.  If so,  then  wheat  programs  have  aided  economic  growth.
On  balance,  the wheat  industry  seems  to have  made  a  satisfac-
tory  contribution  to  national  economic  growth  during  the  period
wheat  programs  have  been  in  operation.  I  recognize  that  wheat
growers  in  different  regions  would  have  fared  differently  under
programs of a different nature.
FOREIGN  TRADE
The  wheat  program  was  defined  earlier  as  one  in  which  the
government  took  discriminatory  commercial  action.  Export  sub-
sidies on  wheat fall  in this  category,  and wheat  exports  have  been
subsidized  almost continuously since  the Farm Board  days.  It prob-
ably  is  subjected  to  more  restrictions,  government  controls,  and
political tampering than any other commodity.
Before  examining  the  relationship  between  domestic  wheat
programs and foreign wheat programs,  a review  of the world wheat
situation seems  in order.
The  population of the world  is  expected  to be  more  than  6  bil-
lion by the year 2000.  In 1950 it was  about 2.5  billion,  and by  1975
it is  expected to be about 4 billion. These  people will eat something.
Wheat is the leading food in international trade.
According  to  an  October  1961  world  food  budget  estimate  of
USDA,  the  annual  wheat  equivalent  needed  to  meet  minimum
nutritional  standards  is  equal  to  the  total  U.  S.  carryover.  This
means  that the  surplus  of  wheat  built  up  in  the  U.  S. since  1950
could  be used in one  year by the hungry  people  of the world.  The
U.  S.  and  world  carryover  next  year  will  be  reduced  as  world
production  for  1963  will be substantially  below world demand.
Since World War II,  U.  S. exports have  grown until they  exceed
domestic  use.  When  agricultural  policy  was  being  debated  in  the
late  1920's  and  early  1930's,  wheat  exports  were  a  minor  concern.
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and export programs.  Policy  was  concerned  almost exclusively  with
domestic protection.
Domestic  and  export  programs  are  almost  in  direct  conflict  in
many respects.  It appears  that the higher the  domestic price support
the greater the export subsidy.  But the relation  is not a direct 1 to  1
ratio.  In international  competition,  Argentina  and  Australia  under-
price  the  U.  S. just enough to  clear  their supplies.  Canada  and  the
U.  S. hold the umbrella.  If we  hold it high, our  competition charges
higher  prices.  Under  these  circumstances  our  subsidy  remains  es-
sentially  the  same.  So  the  conflict  over  domestic  and  export  price
levels,  while  present,  is  not quite  as bad as  it may seem.
The pressure  to  export  wheat  comes  from  the "push"  of  carry-
over  stocks  as  well as  the "pull" of human hunger.  In recent  years,
carryover  of all wheat has been larger than annual use for domestic
and export purposes. Hard red winter wheat is  in the largest supply
either  relative  to  production  or  use,  with  the  possible  exception  of
durum.
I will  give  one  illustration  of how  domestic  and foreign  policy
conflicts  have  contributed  to  the  imbalance.  Other  examples  are
easy  to  find.  If  you were  to  examine  a map  showing  basic  county
price  support  levels,  you  would  notice  support  rates  are  "backed
down" to  the  local  level from  selected  terminals.  The  approximate
difference  is  the cost of  handling  and  transport  under the  assump-
tion  that  wheat  would  move  in  the  U.  S. generally  from  west  to
east. We  cannot quarrel with this  basis  for county  loan  rates  as far
as the domestic movement  is  concerned.  However,  we  also  need to
consider the export market. Let us examine how the county  support
rates  affect  the  source  for  U.  S. exports  of  hard  red  winter  wheat.
Normally,  we think  of hard red winter  as being produced  in the
high  plains  of  Nebraska,  Wyoming,  Kansas,  Colorado,  Oklahoma,
New  Mexico,  and  Texas.  But  the  area  where  hard  red  winter  is
grown  is  much  greater  than  this.  In  many  counties  in  Illinois,
Missouri,  and Iowa,  over 90 percent of the wheat acreage  is planted
to  hard  red  winter  varieties.  This  is  significant  because  of  the
wide  range in quality  of hard  red winter wheat.  Millers  and  cereal
chemists  generally  acknowledge  that hard red  winter  grown in  the
more  humid  areas  is  of  lower  use  value  than  the  same  varieties
grown in the high plains.
The  export  subsidy  for  the  same  grade  of  wheat  under  the
federal  standards  is  the  same for wheat grown  in the  two locations.
Export subsidies  are based on federal grades.  Federal  grades  do not
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Exporters  will  always  fill  contracts  with the  least  cost  wheat  per-
missable.  To  ship wheat by barge from  Adams  County,  Illinois  to  a
Gulf  export  position  costs  about  22  cents  per  hundredweight  less
than  the  cheapest  rail,  truck,  or  barge  combination  from  Jewell
County,  Kansas.  Guess  which  wheat  is  exported  first  when  the
price  support  is about the same in Adams  County, Illinois  as  Jewell
County,  Kansas  for  the  same  grade  of  hard winter  wheat?  If  any
remains,  it will be in the high plains.
Now  let  us compare  support  levels  and market prices  at Kansas
City and St. Louis  for the  1962 crop year.  In only two weeks  of the
entire  1962-63 market season were market prices for average  quality
wheat  above  government  loan  in  Kansas  City.  In  only  two  weeks
was  the support rate  for  No.  2  wheat higher  than market  prices  at
St.  Louis.  Wheat  was  priced  at  St.  Louis  so  it  would  move  into
market  channels.  In  Kansas  City,  prices  favored  storage.
With  the present  program  and  existing  support price  structure,
the  U.  S. will continue  to  supply  the  foreign  market  with  poorer
quality  hard  red  winter wheat.  For the foreign  aid program  wheat
is  as  useful  as  many  other  commodities.  However,  the  result  is  a
government managed export trade in wheat.
POLITICAL  FEASIBILITY
The  wheat  referendum  vote  of  May  21  surprised  many  people.
The  rewards  of a  "yes"  vote  in  the referendum  were  generally  as-
sumed to be so  great, and the consequences  of a "no" vote so  severe
that at least two-thirds  of those voting  were  expected  to vote  "yes."
After  12  favorable  votes  in wheat  referendums,  we  finally  found  a
program  that was not politically  feasible  to wheat  growers.  Earlier,
many  programs  were  found  to be politically  infeasible  to Congress,
or to the administration.
In recent years  only a handful of farmers have bothered  to  vote.
But  when  the  1964  referendum  was  held,  a  total  of  1.2  million
voted,  almost  six  times  the  number  who  voted  on  the  1963  crop.
Interest in the last referendum was widespread.
For adoption  of market  control  programs,  a  two-thirds  majority
has  been  required.  In  all  previous  elections  this  majority  was
achieved  with  a clear  margin.  However,  the  margin  was  close  for
the  1963  crop.  The  1964  program  did  not  carry  by  even  a  simple
majority.  To  be  sure,  grumblings  of  dissatisfaction  had  increased
with  increased  controls.  However,  when  the  act  was  passed  for
wheat harvested in 1964 and subsequent  years, few believed growers
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trols was largely disregarded.
Only  six state  approved  the control  provisions  of the  1964  pro-
gram,  and  none  of  these  states  is  of  great  commercial  importance
in  the  wheat  industry.
One important question that still remains  is: What is a politically
feasible  wheat program?  I do  not know!
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